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Abstract 
People regularly form expectations about their future, and whether those expectations are 
positive or negative can have important consequences. So, what determines the valence of 
people’s expectations? Research seeking to answer this question by using an individual-
differences approach has established that trait biases in optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs and, 
more recently, trait biases in behavioral tendencies to weight one’s past positive vs. negative 
experiences more heavily each predicts the valence of people's typical expectations. However, 
these two biases do not correlate, suggesting limits on a purely individual-differences approach 
to predicting people’s expectations. We hypothesize that, because these two biases appear to 
operate via distinct processes (with self-beliefs operating top-down and valence weighting bias 
operating bottom-up), to predict a person’s expectations on a given occasion, it is also critical to 
consider situational factors influencing processing style. To test this hypothesis, we investigated 
how an integral part of future-thinking that influences processing style –mental imagery– 
determines each bias’s influence. Two experiments measured valence weighting biases and 
optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs, then manipulated whether participants formed expectations 
using their own first-person perspective (which facilitates bottom-up processes) or an external 
third-person perspective (which facilitates top-down processes). Expectations corresponded more 
with valence weighting biases from the first-person (vs. third-person) but more with self-beliefs 
from the third-person (vs. first-person). Two additional experiments manipulated valence 
weighting bias, demonstrating its causal role in shaping expectations (and behaviors) with first-
person, but not third-person, imagery. These results suggest the two biases operate via distinct 
processes, holding implications for interventions to increase optimism. 
Keywords: optimism, valence weighting bias, expectation formation, imagery perspective, 
mental simulation 
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Does the Future Look Bright? Processing Style Determines the Impact of Valence 
Weighting Biases and Self-Beliefs on Expectations 
The future is inherently ambiguous and uncertain. Yet, despite this fact, people often 
think about their futures and form expectations for what is to come. Indeed, when faced with an 
upcoming event, forming expectations about how it will unfold seems like a natural and almost 
unavoidable response. How many people could be told by their boss to “Come by my office 
before leaving work today,” and not instantly begin to think about what might happen at the 
impending meeting? Forming expectations in the face of an uncertain future is part of the human 
experience. Further, the expectations people form are not idle musings: expecting a bad grade on 
a test can fill a student with dread, expecting success can spur a smitten romantic to ask out her 
love interest, and fearing losses can lead people to underinvest their money and earn significantly 
less over time (e.g., Mehra & Prescott, 1985). That is, people’s expectations—and in particular 
whether those expectations are positive or negative—have consequences for their emotions, 
behaviors, and outcomes (Feather, 1966). In fact, whether people chronically tend to form 
positive or negative expectations may even impact the length of their lives (e.g. Kim et al., 
2016). Thus, understanding how people form expectations, and what factors determine the 
valence of those expectations, is a critically important pursuit. 
One way to approach this question is to identify types of people who tend to form 
positive or negative expectations. Traditionally, research has done so using self-report measures 
of optimism. These measures show that people endorse reliable propositional beliefs about the 
general positivity or negativity of their futures (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). More 
recently, research has employed a behavioral measure of people’s tendency to weight past 
positive (or negative) learning more heavily when forming expectations about ambiguous future 
events. This measure shows that people exhibit reliable biases in their valence weighting (Fazio, 
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Pietri, Rocklage, & Shook, 2015). Interestingly, while self-beliefs and valence weighting biases 
can each reliably predict people’s expectations on average, people’s biases on these two 
dimensions are not necessarily consistent (Fazio et al., 2015). So, a person who appears 
optimistic on one dimension may not necessarily appear optimistic on the other. Together, these 
facts suggest that valence weighting tendencies represent a chronic bias in expectation formation 
that is distinct from people’s chronic bias in their self-beliefs about the future. As such, one 
might conclude that simply taking into account people’s level of bias on both dimensions should 
improve our ability to predict the valence of their expectations on a given occasion. However, we 
propose that considering an additional, situationally-varying factor is also critical. 
In particular, we hypothesize that valence weighting tendencies and self-beliefs operate 
via qualitatively distinct processes. Specifically, we hypothesize that, whereas self-beliefs bias 
expectations via top-down processes, valence weighting tendencies bias expectations via bottom-
up processes. And, because the extent to which people rely on top-down and bottom-up 
processes can shift based on situational influences (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2008), predicting the valence of people’s 
expectations on any given occasion requires not only considering their chronic biases in self-
beliefs and valence-weighting, but also considering the extent to which people are relying on 
top-down and bottom-up processes to generate their expectations. 
The present research investigates how variation in a common aspect of future-thinking, 
mental imagery, might cause people to form expectations in line with one type of chronic bias or 
the other by differentially facilitating top-down or bottom-up processing. On a theoretical level, 
this research sheds light on the expectation formation process and the underlying mechanisms 
that bias whether people tend to form positive or negative expectations. It also helps clarify the 
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cognitive functions of the processing styles evoked by mental imagery. Finally, on a practical 
level, this research offers insights for interventions aimed at helping people form more adaptive 
expectations for the future. 
Chronic Biases in Expectation Formation 
Past efforts to predict the valence of people’s expectations have attempted to identify 
different types of people that are more likely to form positive or negative expectations—i.e., 
optimists or pessimists. Traditionally, this approach employed self-report measures to assess the 
positivity or negativity of people’s propositional belief systems regarding their personal future. 
For example, the most widely used scale for optimism measures the extent to which respondents 
endorse statements such as “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad” 
(Scheier, et al., 1994). Trait hope, a similar construct that focuses on the extent to which people 
believe there are pathways to achieving their goals and that they are able to achieve their goals, is 
measured much the same way (Snyder, et al., 1991). To the extent that the logic of these 
propositional belief systems guides people’s expectations, those who endorse more positive 
beliefs should form more positive expectations. For instance, following the logic that “more 
good things than bad things happen to me” should bias a worker who has been called into his 
boss’s office to be more likely to expect praise than censure. Indeed, a vast amount of research 
shows that, on average, the positivity of people’s self-beliefs about the future predict their 
expectations and behaviors across a variety of domains (e.g. Scheier, et al., 1994; Snyder et al., 
1991). 
More recent research has taken a different approach to identify whether a given 
individual is more likely to form positive or negative expectations (Fazio et al., 2015). In 
particular, this research uses an implicit, performance-based measure to assess stable individual 
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differences in the extent to which people overgeneralize their past positive or negative 
experiences when thinking about future events. A tendency to weight past positive (or negative) 
experiences more heavily is believed to shape people’s reactions to ambiguous future events. 
And, to the extent that these reactions guide people’s expectations, those with more positive 
weighting biases should form more positive expectations. For instance, a worker with negative 
valence weighting tendencies should be biased to have a negative reaction to being called into 
his boss’s office and, therefore, be more likely to expect censure than praise. 
Indeed, a growing body of work shows that individual differences in people’s valence 
weighting tendencies predict their expectations across a variety of domains (Fazio et al., 2015): 
when considering hypothetical events in their lives, people with negative valence weighting 
biases are more rejection sensitive, report greater fear of novel situations, and are more risk-
averse (Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 2013b). Further, valence weighting biases not only affect 
people’s reports about hypothetical events in their lives, but also guide actual behavior. For 
instance, people with positive valence weighting biases are more willing to take risks to earn 
rewards (Pietri, et al., 2013b). Further, building from the evidence that valence weighting 
tendencies predict rejection sensitivity and willingness to approach novel situations, a 
prospective real-world study found that first-year college students with more positive valence 
weighting biases made more friends over the course of their first few months on campus 
(Rocklage, Pietri, & Fazio, 2017). 
However, despite the fact that self-beliefs about the future and the valence weighting bias 
each predicts people’s expectations on average, evidence suggests that these two biases are 
sometimes discrepant within individuals. People seem unable to accurately self-report their 
valence weighting bias (Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 2013b), and valence weighting biases do not tend 
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to correlate with people’s positive or negative self-beliefs about the future (Fazio, et al., 2015). 
As such, a person who appears optimistic on one dimension may not necessarily appear 
optimistic on the other. This fact suggests that considering people’s chronic bias on both 
dimensions should improve predictions about the valence of their expectations on any given 
occasion. However, we hypothesize that considering an additional, situationally-varying factor is 
essential: the process by which people form their expectations on that particular occasion. 
Top-down and Bottom-up Processes in the Context of Expectation Formation 
We propose that a critical difference between the two trait biases is that they operate via 
qualitatively distinct processes. Specifically, we hypothesize that people’s propositional beliefs 
about the positivity of their future bias expectations through a top-down mechanism that 
structures their interpretation of a future event according to the logic of their belief systems. In 
contrast, we hypothesize that people’s valence weighting tendencies bias expectations through a 
bottom-up mechanism that shapes their interpretation of a future event by influencing their 
experiential reactions to it. The idea that the two trait biases operate via qualitatively distinct 
processes helps make sense of why the two biases are not correlated and, critically, holds 
important implications for predicting when one bias or the other is more likely to shape a 
person’s expectations on a given occasion. 
Unlike traditional measures of optimism that reflect a person’s self-reported beliefs about 
the future, the valence weighting bias reflects a person’s implicit, behaviorally-measured 
tendency to form positive or negative expectations. As such, the lack of correspondence between 
self-beliefs and valence weighting bias is analogous to discrepancies between other explicitly- 
and implicitly-measured constructs (e.g. attitudes) which have been explained by dual-processes 
underlying people’s judgments (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
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Olson & Fazio, 2008). Applying the logic of these explanations, people’s valence weighting bias 
and self-beliefs may not align if other factors make it difficult for people to accurately identify 
biases in their valence weighting tendencies or if people are motivated to hold particular beliefs 
about their optimism. Indeed, both of these possibilities appear to contribute to the discrepancy. 
First, people may be unable to report their valence weighting biases (Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 
2013b) because, in the real world, valence is often confounded with other variables such as 
distinctiveness and diagnosticity (e.g., Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), 
making it difficult for people to identify and learn about asymmetries in their valence weighting 
tendencies per se (Fazio, et al., 2015). Second, people may be motivated to hold particular 
beliefs about whether they are an optimist or pessimist. For instance, the social desirability of 
“positive thinking” appears to motivate many people to hold the self-belief that they are the type 
of person who tends to form positive expectations about the future (Shweizer, Beck-Seyffer, & 
Schneider, 1999; Rauch, Schweizer, & Moosbrugger, 2007). Alternatively, some people 
strategically adopt pessimistic beliefs as a self-protective mechanism to reduce their emotional 
reactions in the face of negative outcomes (Norem & Cantor, 1986a; 1986b). Thus, many people 
can (and do) hold propositional beliefs about their future that conflict with their valence 
weighting tendencies. 
Beyond making sense of why the valence weighting bias does not correlate with people’s 
self-beliefs about the future, the insight that these two biases operate via qualitatively distinct 
processes has important implications for predicting the valence of a person’s expectations on a 
given occasion. Because a person’s reliance on top-down and bottom-up processes can vary 
depending on situational influences, in addition to considering a person’s level of chronic bias on 
each dimension, it should be critical to consider the processes driving their expectations in any 
Does the future look bright? 9 
particular instance. If the two chronic biases are based in different processes as we propose, then 
variables that influence people’s reliance on top-down versus bottom-up processes should 
moderate each bias’s influence on expectation formation. That is, increasing reliance on bottom-
up (vs. top-down) processing should cause people to form expectations more in line with their 
valence weighting biases, and less in line with their self-beliefs about the future. In the present 
research, we explore one such moderating variable that is integrally involved in thinking about 
the future: visual perspective in mental imagery.  
How Mental Imagery Influences Reliance on Top-down vs. Bottom-up Processing 
People use mental imagery to simulate the future and make predictions about how it will 
unfold (Wheeler Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Critically, this 
visual imagery is not merely epiphenomenal, but rather, plays a functional role in supporting 
cognition (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2011). We are interested in the role that a particular inherent 
feature of mental imagery–its visual perspective—may play in determining the basis for people’s 
expectations about imagined events by shifting people’s reliance on top-down and bottom-up 
processing. 
Visual images necessarily have a perspective, and visual images of events involving the 
self can be constructed from either one’s own first-person visual perspective, or an external 
third-person visual perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). The vast majority of people report 
spontaneously using each perspective and are able to vary which perspective they use at will 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Rice & Rubin, 2009). And, as is the case with other features of mental 
imagery, this feature serves a cognitive function. The two perspectives appear to facilitate two 
qualitatively distinct processing styles (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Specifically, third-person 
imagery facilitates a conceptual processing style in which people achieve a coherent 
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understanding of an event in terms of their broader abstract belief systems, whereas first-person 
imagery facilitates an experiential processing style in which people understand an event based on 
the phenomenology evoked by the concrete features of the pictured scene. 
Consistent with this account, imagery perspective affects how people construe and 
interpret events (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009; Shaeffer, Libby, & Eibach, 2015): the third-
person perspective (vs. first-person) causes people to construe pictured actions, such as “locking 
the door,” more abstractly (e.g. as “securing the house” vs. “turning a key”). Further, mentally 
simulating personal events from the third-person perspective (vs. first-person) increases reliance 
on top-down processing, causing people to coherently integrate events with their abstract belief 
systems (Libby & Eibach, 2011). As such, people’s reactions to imaged events from the third-
person perspective (vs. first-person) more closely correspond with their propositional beliefs 
pertaining to a variety of domains including their self-reported personality traits, values, 
preferences, and developmental trajectories (Libby, Valenti, Hines, & Eibach, 2014; Libby & 
Eibach, 2011; Marigold, Eibach, Libby, Ross, & Holmes, 2015). 
In addition to reducing reliance on top-down processes, mentally simulating personal 
events from the first-person perspective (vs. third-person) increases reliance on bottom-up 
processes (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Evidence supporting this idea comes from research in which 
people’s reactions to imagined events from the first-person perspective (vs. third-person) 
corresponded less with their propositional self-beliefs, and corresponded more with their 
experiential reactions to concrete features of the pictured scene (Libby, et al., 2014; Niese, et al., 
2018). For instance, in one experiment, when participants imagined how they would vote in an 
upcoming election, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) caused their behavioral intentions to 
align more with their implicitly-measured preference (assessed via the pIAT; Olson & Fazio, 
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2004) for one candidate or the other and align less with their explicitly-measured preference 
(assessed via self-report).  
Evidence corroborating the processing style mechanism for such effects comes from 
other experiments that manipulated imagery perspective (first-person vs. third-person) using 
photographs of everyday actions unrelated to target judgments (e.g., Niese et al., 2018; Shaeffer 
et al., 2015); varying perspective via action photographs unrelated to the target judgment 
replicates the effects of varying perspective via instructions for mentally visualizing a scene 
directly related to the target judgment. As such, these results support the notion that perspective 
operates by shifting processing style, rather than by merely changing the salience of information 
that is only relevant to the pictured scene.  Thus, a variety of past research suggests that, by 
shifting processing style, imagery perspective differentially facilitates reliance on top-down or 
bottom-up processes. 
The present research seeks to build from the evidence that each imagery perspective 
differentially facilitates reliance on top-down or bottom-up processes in order to test the 
hypothesis that people’s valence weighting biases influence expectation formation through a 
distinct mechanism from people’s self-beliefs about the future. That is, if self-beliefs operate via 
top-down processes, then expectations should align more with people’s self-beliefs about the 
future with third-person imagery (vs. first-person imagery). In contrast, if the valence weighting 
bias operates via bottom-up processes, then people should form expectations that align more with 
their valence weighting biases with first-person imagery (vs. third-person imagery). As such, this 
approach uses a variable that is integrally involved in thinking about the future—visual 
perspective in mental imagery—that influences reliance on top-down vs. bottom-up processes to 
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help understand the conditions under which the valence weighting bias, as opposed to self-beliefs 
about the future, guides expectations. 
The Present Research 
Four experiments manipulated imagery perspective as individuals formed expectations 
about ambiguous future events in their lives. Beforehand, we used traditional self-report 
measures of trait optimism and hope to index biases in people’s self-beliefs about the future 
(Scheier, et al., 1994; Snyder et al., 1991), and we used the performance-based measure 
BeanFest to index people’s valence weighting biases (Pietri et al., 2013b). If these two biases 
operate via different processing styles as we propose, then imagery perspective should influence 
the extent to which each bias shapes people’s expectations for the future. 
Based on previous work, we expected that by facilitating top-down influences, third-
person imagery (vs. first-person) would cause people to make predictions about ambiguous 
future events more in line with their self-reported trait optimism and hope. Additionally, we 
expected that by facilitating bottom-up processes, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) would 
cause people to make predictions about ambiguous future events more in line with their valence 
weighting biases. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 sought to provide evidence that valence weighting 
biases better predict people’s expectations when another variable (i.e. first-person imagery) 
facilitates the influences of bottom-up processes, whereas traditional measures of people’s self-
beliefs better predict their expectations when another variable (i.e. third-person imagery) 
facilities the influence of top-down processes. This predicted result would provide novel, 
converging evidence that the valence weighting bias operates via a qualitatively distinct process 
from people’s self-beliefs about the future, and by extension, allow us to better predict when the 
valence weighting bias, as opposed to self-beliefs, is likely to guide expectations. 
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Experiments 3 and 4 sought to provide stronger evidence that people’s valence weighting 
biases causally shape their expectations via a bottom-up process. To do so, Experiments 3 and 4 
manipulated, rather than measured, people’s valence weighting bias before manipulating imagery 
perspective as people formed expectations. We predicted that manipulating the valence 
weighting bias would shape people’s expectations with the bottom-up processing style evoked by 
first person-imagery, but not with the top-down processing style evoked by third-person imagery. 
 Experiment 4 also sought to provide additional convergent evidence for the role of 
processing style in producing the current effects. To do so, Experiment 4 used a different, 
previously-validated method of manipulating imagery perspective to induce the processing style 
differences observed with mental imagery instruction (Shaeffer et al., 2015). Finally, Experiment 
4 sought to extend Experiments 1 through 3 by investigating the consequences of shifting the 
basis for people’s expectations. In particular, rather than measure people’s reports of their 
expectations to hypothetical scenarios, Experiment 4 used a behavioral measure that assessed 
people’s actual risk-taking behavior in a task with real monetary consequences. Together, the 
present experiments offer insight into the mechanisms underlying two distinct trait biases that 
influence people’s expectations, with implications for improving interventions to help people 
reap the benefits of seeing their futures in a more positive light. 
Experiments 1 & 2 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we indexed biases in people’s self-beliefs about the future by 
measuring their self-reported optimism and hope (Scheier, et al., 1994; Snyder et al., 1991), and 
we indexed their valence weighting biases via the performance-based measure BeanFest (Pietri 
et al., 2013b). In a separate session, we manipulated the imagery perspective that participants 
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used to visualize events happening in their lives and make predictions about how positively or 
negatively they would turn out.  
The only difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was how we measured participants’ 
expectations. Following past procedure (see Pietri et al., 2013b), Experiment 1 provided 
participants with three possible explanations for each scenario they visualized (one positive, one 
negative, and one neutral) and asked them to rank-order these explanations from most to least 
likely. Experiment 2 instead asked participants to generate up to seven of their own explanations 
for each scenario before rating how positive and how negative each of their explanations would 
be for them. Thus, the procedure for Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with the exception of 
using a conceptually-identical dependent measure that better represents the full range of possible 
expectations people might form when imagining the scenarios and captures idiosyncrasies across 
participants in how positive or negative each outcome would be for them personally.  
In both experiments, we expected imagery perspective to moderate the extent to which 
participants’ expectations corresponded with their valence weighting bias versus their self-beliefs 
about the positivity of the future. Specifically, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) should 
cause expectations to correspond more closely with valence weighting biases and less closely 
with self-beliefs about the future. 
Method 
Participants. We posted ample experiment sessions using an online sign-up tool with the 
goal of obtaining a minimum of 60 participants per perspective condition.
1
 Using this
recruitment method, one-hundred sixty-two undergraduates participated in Experiment 1 for 
1  We aimed to collect at least 60 participants per cell because this number is consistent with the sample sizes of other 
similar experiments investigating imagery perspective’s moderating role on implicitly- vs. explicitly-measured 
constructs (e.g., Libby et al., 2014). 
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course credit. Analyses excluded a participant who did not follow instructions during the 
BeanFest game (n =1) and participants who failed a self-report attention check at the end of the 
visualization task (n =15),
2
 leaving data from 146 participants (79 female, 67 male; 72 first-
person). Sensitivity analyses indicate that this experiment is adequately powered to detect a small 
effect (f
2
 = 0.05) at 80% power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Experiment 2 used the same recruitment strategy as Experiment 1. One-hundred thirty-
one undergraduates participated in Experiment 2 for course credit. Analyses excluded 
participants whose computers crashed during the BeanFest game (n =3), a participant who did 
not complete both sessions (n = 1), and participants who failed the self-report attention check at 
the end of the online session (n = 5), leaving data from 122 participants (48 female, 74 male; 61 
first-person). Sensitivity analyses indicate that this experiment is adequately powered to detect a 
small effect (f
2
 = 0.07) at 80% power (Faul, et al., 2007).
Procedure & Materials  
Session 1 (In Lab): Measuring Chronic Biases in Expectation Formation 
Self-Beliefs Questionnaire. Participants entered the lab and sat at computers in 
individual cubicles. Participants first completed a computerized questionnaire containing a 
battery of individual difference measures of their self-beliefs about the positivity of the future. 
Life Orientation Test-Revised (Scheier et al., 1994). Participants completed an individual 
difference measure assessing the extent to which they endorsed a positive or negative system of 
2
 Participants completed the visualization task in Experiments 1 through 3 in a separate session online. Because it is 
important for our manipulation that they were actively engaged in the task and imagining the scenarios, we asked 
participants to self-report how much attention they paid to the task and informed them that their answers would in no 
way affect their course credit. We excluded participants who indicated that they engaged in one or more of the 
following behaviors during the online portion of the experiment: “I did not pay much attention to the task,” “I did 
not visualize the scenarios,” “I did not understand the instructions,” or “I was doing other things on my computer 
while completing the task.” The number of participants excluded did not differ by perspective condition in any of 
the three experiments (ps > 0.37). 
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beliefs regarding their future. The measure consists of six scored items such as, “In uncertain 
times, I usually expect the best” and “If something can go wrong for me, it will,” (reverse-
scored) as well as four filler items. Participants responded to each item on a scale ranging from 
(1) I strongly disagree to (9) I strongly agree. Participants’ responses to the six scored items
were reversed-scored where appropriate and then averaged, with higher numbers reflecting 
higher general optimistic expectations (Experiment 1: M = 6.03, SD = 1.23, α = 0.78; 
Experiment 2: M = 6.00, SD = 1.27, α = 0.83). 
Adult Trait Hope Scale (Snyder et. al., 1991). Participants also completed an individual 
difference measure assessing the extent to which they endorsed a set of beliefs indicating hope 
for the future. The measure consists of eight scored items such as, “I meet the goals that I set for 
myself” and “Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way to solve the problem,” 
as well as four filler items. Participants responded to each item on a scale ranging from (1) 
Definitely false to (8) Definitely true. Participants’ responses to the eight scored items were 
averaged, with higher numbers reflecting higher trait hope (Experiment 1: M = 5.95, SD = 0.79, 
α = 0.82; Experiment 2: M = 6.29, SD = 0.87, α = 0.88). 
Additional Measures. In addition to answering questions indexing self-beliefs about the 
future, participants completed a few other self-report measures for exploratory purposes. 
Participants completed the Weighting Bias Questionnaire (Pietri et al., 2013b), which assessed 
their ability (or lack thereof) to explicitly report their valence weighting bias. The measure 
consists of four items such as, “If you see something that appears equally negative and equally 
positive, how would you tend to categorize it?” answered on seven-point scales (e.g. (1) Always 
categorize it as negative to (7) Always categorize it as positive). Participants’ responses to the 
four items were reverse-scored where appropriate and then averaged, with higher scores 
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indicating beliefs about weighting positive information more heavily (Experiment 1: M = 4.43, 
SD = 0.94, α = 0.79; Experiment 2: M = 4.67, SD = 0.84, α = 0.92). Finally, for exploratory 
purposes, participants also completed individual difference measures of their self-esteem 
(Rosenberg, 1965) and, in Experiment 1 only, rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996). 
Performance-Based Measure of Valence Weighting Bias. After finishing the 
questionnaires, participants completed the game, BeanFest (following the procedure in Pietri et 
al., 2013b). This game provided a performance-based measure of valence weighting bias. 
BeanFest (Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004). Participants first read instructions about how to 
play the game. Participants were told they would be viewing beans one at a time and would need 
to decide whether to select each bean or not. The beans varied in their shape (10 levels from 
circular to oblong) and their number of speckles (1 to 10), creating a 10x10 matrix of 100 beans. 
During the game, participants saw 36 out of the 100 total beans. The 36 game beans were 
selected from six different regions of the matrix that were assigned to be positive or negative. 
When participants selected a positive bean, their score increased by ten points; when they 
selected a negative bean, their score decreased by ten points. If participants decided not to select 
a bean, they were still shown its value but saw no change in their points; this ensured that 
participants would receive information about the valence of each bean regardless of whether they 
chose to select it or not. The participants’ goal was to learn which types of beans were positive 
and which types were negative so that they could earn as many points as possible.  
Participants began by completing six practice trials so that they could become familiar 
with the buttons and screen displays. They then completed three game-phase blocks, each 
consisting of the 36 beans that had been assigned as positive or negative. The 36 game beans 
were presented in random order and retained their value across all three game-phase blocks. 
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Participants started each game with 50 points and their total score could range from 0 to 100 
points. If their score reached 0, they were told they lost, and if it reached 100, they were told they 
won. After winning or losing a game, their score was reset to 50 and they continued playing. 
Regardless of the number of times participants won or lost during each game-phase block, they 
still viewed all 36 game beans and the beans’ values did not change. 
After completing the game-phase blocks, participants continued on to the test phase. In 
the test phase, participants viewed all 100 beans from the matrix individually in random order 
and categorized each one as “harmful” or “helpful” with no score or feedback. Participants’ 
responses to the 36 game beans allowed us to assess how well they learned the values of positive 
and negative beans. Additionally, the remaining 64 beans were novel stimuli that were visually 
similar to the game-phase beans. Critically, many of these beans were similar to a region that 
was positive in the game phase as well as similar to a region that was negative in the game phase, 
forcing participants to weight either their previous positive or negative learning more heavily in 
order to classify the novel bean. For instance, some participants may have learned during the 
game phase that circular beans with few speckles were positive, but circular beans with many 
speckles were negative. Then, at test, when these participants saw a novel circular bean with a 
medium amount of speckles, they had to classify it as harmful or helpful. People with negative 
valence weighting biases are more likely to have negative reactions to this bean and classify it as 
harmful, whereas people with positive valence weighting biases are more likely to have positive 
reactions and classify it as helpful. In this way, BeanFest indexes individual differences in 
people’s experiential expectations about the valence of ambiguous information. 
Session 2 (Online): Manipulating Imagery Perspective and Measuring Expectations 
Does the future look bright? 19 
Manipulating Imagery Perspective. Two days after participants completed the self-report 
questionnaires and behavioral game BeanFest, we emailed them a link to complete the second 
part of the experiment online.
3
 In the online portion, participants completed a modified version
of the Interpretation Questionnaire (Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 2013a) in which they visually 
imagined thirteen ambiguous future scenarios happening in their own lives. The original 
questionnaire directs respondents to imagine thirteen ambiguous future scenarios (e.g. “Your 
boss calls you into their office,” “You walk into a room and someone looks in your direction,” 
“You reach for your wallet/pocketbook and cannot find it,” etc.), which we modified by 
explicitly instructing participants to visualize each scenario. Additionally, we randomly assigned 
participants to complete one of two versions of the questionnaire that only differed in the 
imagery perspective they were instructed to use while visualizing the scenarios. Participants in 
the first-person condition were instructed for all the scenarios to “Imagine the scene from your 
own visual perspective, in other words, you are looking out at your surroundings through you 
own eyes,” whereas those in the third-person condition were instructed for all the scenarios to 
“Imagine the scene from an observer’s visual perspective, in other words, you can see yourself 
in the image, as well as your surroundings.” After imagining each scenario, participants used a 
scale ranging from (0) No image at all to (4) Perfectly clear and vivid to rate how vivid their 
mental imagery was and a scale ranging from (-3) Very difficult to (3) Very easy to rate how easy 
it was for them to imagine the scenario.
4
3
 We chose to split the procedure into two sessions based on pilot data suggesting that completing the entire 
experiment in a single session was too fatiguing for participants to remain fully engaged (see the supplementary 
material for more details). 
4
 Average reports of imagery vividness were not significantly different across perspective in either experiment or 
when combined and analyzed together (Combined: F(1, 266) = 2.19, p = 0.23; first-person: M = 1.81, SD = 0.61; 
third-person: M = 2.10, SD = 0.56). Average reports of how easy it was to imagine the scenarios were also not 
significantly different across perspective for either experiment or when combined and analyzed together, although 
there was a trend for first-person imagery to be reported as slightly easier (Combined: F(1, 266) = 3.19, p = 0.08; 
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Measuring Expectations. 
Experiment 1: Participants in Experiment 1 visualized each scenario using the specified 
imagery perspective and then, as in the original interpretation questionnaire (Pietri et al., 2013a), 
received three possible explanations for the ambiguous event. For each scenario, one of the 
explanations was positive (e.g. “Your boss is going to promote you”), one was negative (e.g. 
“Your boss is going to fire you”), and one was neutral (e.g. “Your boss has a question for you”). 
Instructions directed participants to order the explanations from most to least likely.  
Following past procedure (Pietri et al., 2013a), we scored the interpretation questionnaire 
by first calculating “positive” and “negative” scores. For each scenario, participants received a 
positive score of three when they ranked the positive interpretation as most likely, a positive 
score of two when they ranked it second most likely, and a positive score of one when they 
ranked it least likely. The same method was used to calculate a negative score for each scenario. 
Then, we calculated a difference score for each participant between the means of their positive 
and negative scores across the thirteen scenarios (M = -0.04, SD = 0.48) to serve as an index of 
the average valence of participants’ expectations about the future events. 
Experiment 2: Experiment 2 sought to replicate Experiment 1 using a more ecologically-
valid version of our dependent measure. Rather than rank-ordering three possible interpretations, 
participants visualized each scenario using the specified imagery perspective and then came up 
with their own explanations for how they expected the event to unfold. First, participants were 
asked to generate up to seven explanations for each ambiguous event (e.g. “Why does your boss 
want to see you?”). Then, after imagining all the scenarios and generating explanations, 
first-person: M = 5.97, SD = 0.89; third-person: M = 5.78, SD = 0.92). Nonetheless, controlling for ease and its 
interactions with the valence weighting bias and the self-beliefs composite did not change the significance of our 
results in any of the experiments. 
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participants were reshown each explanation
5
 so they could rate how positive it would be for them
on a scale from (0) Not at all positive to (4) Extremely positive and how negative it would be for 
them on a scale from (0) Not at all negative to (4) Extremely negative.
 6
Next, following an analogous procedure to that in Experiment 1, we created a composite 
score indexing how positively or negatively participants tended to expect the scenarios to unfold. 
We created a total positivity score by summing the participants’ ratings for how positive each of 
the explanations would be for them; we also created a total negativity score by summing 
participants’ ratings for how negative each of the explanations would be for them. Finally, we 
calculated a difference score for each participant by subtracting the negativity score from the 
positivity score (M = -17.61, SD = 21.19) to index the valence of participants’ expectations about 
the future events. 
Results 
We predicted that the imagery perspective participants used would determine the extent 
to which their expectations corresponded with their valence weighting bias versus their self-
beliefs about the future. Specifically, first-person (vs. third-person) imagery should cause 
expectations to correspond more closely with valence weighting biases and less closely with self-
beliefs. 
5
 A computer glitch prevented participants from rating the explanations they generated for one of the scenarios 
(“Your phone rings at 3:00 A.M.”) 
6
 Some of the responses that participants provided were not an explanation or reason for the ambiguous event (e.g. “I 
see my boss,” “I don’t know,” “I am nervous”). Because we only wanted to analyze participants’ ratings for 
responses that were explanations or reasons for the ambiguous event, two undergraduate research assistants read all 
the responses in order to exclude inappropriate responses. The research assistants agreed 96% of the time whether or 
not to exclude a response and a third independent research assistant served as the tie-breaker for discrepancies. 
Approximately 7.87% of responses were excluded. There were no differences by perspective condition on the total 
number of responses participants provided F(1,120) = 0.27, p = 0.61, the number of responses excluded F(1,120) = 
0.64, p = 0.43, or the final number of responses included in the analyses F(1,120) = 0.01, p = 0.92. 
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To test these predictions, we first created a composite index of participants’ self-beliefs 
about the future from their trait optimism and trait hope scores, and we calculated individual 
differences in the valence weighting bias from the performance-based measure BeanFest. Then, 
we conducted a single linear regression analysis to predict responses to the interpretation 
questionnaire from participants’ valence weighting biases and self-beliefs, as well as imagery 
perspective and its interaction with each of these chronic biases in expectation formation. 
Preparatory creation of indices. 
Self-beliefs composite. We created a composite of participants’ self-beliefs about the 
future by averaging each participant’s z-scores on the Life Orientation Test-Revised (optimism), 
and the Adult Trait Hope Scale (Experiment 1: SD = 0.81, r(144) = 0.31, p < 0.001; Experiment 
2: SD = 0.89, r(120) = 0.60, p < 0.001). 
Valence weighting bias. Following past procedure (Pietri et al., 2013b), we calculated 
participants’ valence weighting biases by evaluating their responses to novel beans during the 
test phase of BeanFest while controlling for how well they learned the positive and negative 
game beans. To do this, we first calculated each participant’s average response to novel beans by 
coding “Helpful” categorizations as +1 and “Harmful” categorizations as -1. We also measured 
how well participants learned the game beans by coding correct categorization as +1 and 
incorrect categorizations as 0 and then calculating average positive and negative game-bean 
learning scores. Then, to control for how past learning influenced responses to the novel beans, 
we used a linear regression model predicting participants’ average responses to novel beans from 
their positive and negative game-bean learning scores.
 
In order to obtain a regression equation 
that was more stable and less likely to vary based on irregularities in any given experiment, we 
followed past procedure (see Fazio et al., 2015) of running the regression by aggregating the data 
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from the present experiments with a much larger set of over 2000 similar participants that have 
completed BeanFest in the past. Doing so allowed us to calculate valence weighting bias scores 
for each participant that are less likely to fluctuate based on the sample of other participants who 
happen to be in any given experiment. The resulting multiple regression equation was:  
Novel Response = 0.59(Positive Correct) – 0.83(Negative Correct) + 0.08 
From the coefficients in this equation, we can see that participants tend to weight their past 
negative learning more strongly, on average, than their past positive learning when classifying 
novel beans. That is, we can expect participants who learned both positive and negative game 
beans equally well to weight their negative learning more heavily than their positive learning and 
classify more of the novel beans as negative. However, there is also variability across individuals 
in the extent to which this effect occurs, indicating that some participants have particularly 
negative valence weighting biases whereas others show this bias less strongly (or even show a 
positive valence weighting bias).  
 In order to capture this variability, we entered each participant’s past positive and 
negative learning into the regression equation to determine what the participant’s average 
response to the novel beans normatively should have been. Then, we compared this value to each 
participant’s actual average response to the novel beans as a way of capturing the extent to 
which each participant’s valence weighting tendency was more positive or negative than would 
be expected based on past learning. Thus, the residual of this regression served as our measure of 
the valence weighting bias because it captures the extent to which a participant tended to expect 
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novel game beans to be negative (or positive) over and above what we would expect based on 
the participant’s previous learning.7
Testing Imagery Perspective’s Moderating Effect on the Influence of Two Chronic 
Biases in Expectation Formation. 
For each experiment, we used a single linear regression model to predict participants’ 
expectations on the interpretation questionnaire from their valence weighting bias (sample-mean-
centered) and their self-beliefs composite, as well as imagery perspective (-1 = first-person, 1 = 
third-person) and its interactions with the other two measures. We also included the number of 
explanations that participants self-generated as a covariate in Experiment 2. See Tables 1 and 2 
for the regression output in each experiment. 
Primary analyses 
7
 Our composite of participants’ self-beliefs did not significantly correlate with their valence weighting biases 
(Experiment 1: r(144) = -0.01, p = 0.93; Experiment 2: r(120) = 0.17, p = 0.07). Additionally, replicating past 
findings, participants’ explicit reports of their valence weighting biases, as measured by the Weighting Bias 
Questionnaire, did not significantly correlate with their actual valence weighting biases (Experiment 1: r(144) = 
0.06, p = 0.46; Experiment 2: r(120) = 0.06, p = 0.49).  
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Experiment 1: As hypothesized, imagery perspective moderated the role of the valence 
weighting bias in forming expectations about ambiguous future events (b = -0.39, β = -0.15, 
t(140) = -1.95, p = 0.05). Expectations significantly corresponded with the valence weighting 
bias when participants used the first-person perspective (b = 0.64, β = 0.25, t(140) = 2.46, p = 
0.02), but not the third-person perspective (b = -0.14, β = -0.05, t(140) = -0.45, p = 0.65). 
Additionally, as predicted, imagery perspective had the opposite effect in moderating the role of 
self-beliefs (b = 0.12, β = 0.21, t(140) = 2.69, p = 0.01). Expectations significantly corresponded 
with the self-beliefs composite when participants used the third-person perspective (b = 0.30, β = 
0.51, t(140) = 4.73, p < 0.01), but not the first-person perspective (b = 0.06, β = 0.09, t(140) = 
0.80, p = 0.42).
  
See Figure 1. 
Experiment 2: Using an open-ended version of the dependent measure, Experiment 2 
replicated the results from Experiment 1. Imagery perspective again moderated the role of the 
valence weighting bias in forming expectations about ambiguous future events (b = -22.56, β = -
0.19, t(115) = -2.16, p = 0.03). Expectations significantly corresponded with the valence 
weighting bias when participants used the first-person perspective (b = 46.85, β = 0.40, t(115) = 
3.14, p < 0.01), but not the third-person perspective (b = -3.09, β = -0.03, t(115) = -0.21, p = 
0.83). Additionally replicating Experiment 1, imagery perspective had the opposite effect in 
moderating the role of self-beliefs (b = 4.25, β = 0.18, t(115) = 2.02, p = 0.05). Expectations 
significantly corresponded with the self-beliefs composite when participants used the third-
person perspective (b = 7.86, β = 0.33, t(115) = 2.67, p = 0.01), but not the first-person 
perspective (b = 1.73, β = 0.02, t(115) = 0.12, p = 0.91).  See Figure 2. 
Secondary analyses 
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We constructed our primary dependent measure as a difference score because the two 
chronic biases (i.e. valence weighting and self-beliefs) are measured on a single negative-
positive continuum. As such, constructing the dependent measure by subtracting negative scores 
from positive scores creates a single negative-positive continuum that best matches what each of 
these two trait biases are theorized to predict. Nonetheless, one may wonder if the effects on the 
difference score are driven by primarily influencing positive or negative interpretation scores. 
We did not have theoretical grounds a priori to predict that either of the trait biases would 
uniquely influence negative interpretations but not positive interpretations (or vice versa). 
Indeed, analyzing the positive and negative scores separately does not suggest clear patterns 
across experiments that one or the other is consistently driving the effect. Instead, the results 
were directionally consistent with the main analyses, such that both positive and negative 
expectations appeared to correspond more closely with valence weighting bias and less closely 
with self-beliefs with first-person imagery (vs. third-person).  
The interactions for positive expectations were all directionally-consistent with the 
primary analyses, although the strength and significance of these effects varied across 
experiments. Imagery perspective did not significantly moderate the effect of the valence 
weighting bias on positive expectations in Experiment 1 (b = -0.14, β = -0.11, t(140) = -1.35, p = 
0.18) or Experiment 2 (b = -13.38, β = -0.12, t(115) = -1.45, p = 0.15). Imagery perspective did 
significantly moderate the effect of self-beliefs on positive expectations in Experiment 1 (b = 
0.08, β = 0.25, t(140) = 3.11, p < 0.01) but not in Experiment 2 (b = 1.77, β = 0.08, t(115) = 0.95, 
p = 0.34).  
The interactions for negative expectations were also all directionally-consistent with the 
primary analyses, although the strength and significance of these effects also varied across 
Does the future look bright? 27 
experiments. Imagery perspective significantly moderated the effect of the valence weighting 
bias on negative expectations in Experiment 1 (b = 0.25, β = 0.16, t(140) = 1.35, p = 0.04) but 
not in Experiment 2 (b = 9.19, β = 0.08, t(115) = 1.04, p = 0.30). Imagery perspective did not 
significantly moderate the effect of self-beliefs on negative expectations in Experiment 1 (b = -
0.05, β = -0.14, t(140) = -1.74, p = 0.08) or Experiment 2 (b = -2.48, β = -0.10, t(115) = -1.40, p 
= 0.17). 
Discussion 
In two experiments, we found that the imagery perspective people used to visualize 
ambiguous future events differentially modulated the impact of two distinct chronic biases in 
expectation formation. First-person imagery (vs. third-person) caused people to form 
expectations for the future in line with their valence weighting biases. In contrast, third-person 
imagery (vs. first-person) caused people to form expectations for the future in line with their self-
beliefs about the future. These results are consistent with the notion that the valence weighting 
bias influences expectations via bottom-up processes, whereas self-beliefs about the positivity of 
the future influence expectations via top-down processes. Further, this pattern appeared not only 
when participants judged the likelihood of a controlled set of possible alternatives in Experiment 
1, but also when they had the opportunity in Experiment 2 to generate and rate their own 
explanations for the scenarios they visualized.  
Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 provide initial evidence that valence weighting tendencies 
represent a chronic bias in expectation formation that exerts its influence via a qualitatively 
distinct process from that by which people’s chronic bias in their self-beliefs about the future 
operate. As such, in order to predict whether a person will form positive or negative expectations 
on any given occasion, it is critical to understand when the valence weighting bias, as opposed to 
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self-beliefs, is more likely to operate.  Experiments 1 and 2 provided initial evidence for the 
hypothesis that unlike self-beliefs about the future that operate via top-down processes, the 
valence weighting bias exerts its influence through bottom-up processes, and therefore, better 
predicts expectations when another variable increases reliance on bottom-up processing. 
Of course, while these findings demonstrate that imagery perspective causally determines 
the extent to which the valence weighting bias, as opposed to self-beliefs, predicts people’s 
expectations, the findings are silent on whether the valence weighting bias is causally guiding 
expectations via bottom-up processing. That is, would experimentally-manipulated valence 
weighting exert a greater influence on expectations under the bottom-up processing style 
promoted by first-person imagery than the top-down processing style promoted by third-person 
imagery? To address this question, we turned our attention to the consequences of an 
experimental manipulation of valence weighting biases on the judgments that individuals form 
when guided by first-person imagery (vs. third-person). In this way, Experiments 3 and 4 sought 
to demonstrate that the valence weighting bias causally guides expectations via bottom-up 
processing. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 sought to manipulate people’s valence weighting bias in order to provide 
stronger evidence of its causal role in guiding expectations with bottom-up processing. If valence 
weighting tendencies bias expectations via bottom-up processing, then manipulations of people’s 
valence weighting biases should influence the expectations they form with first-person imagery, 
which facilitates a bottom-up processing style. In contrast, these manipulations should be 
attenuated or even eliminated with third-person imagery, which facilitates a top-down processing 
style. 
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To manipulate valence weighting tendencies, we used a previously-validated method of 
recalibrating people’s valence weighting biases to be more neutral using a modified version of 
the game BeanFest (Pietri et al., 2013a). In this method, people are given clear and immediate 
feedback about each of the expectations they form about novel beans during the test phase of the 
game. As such, if participants have a negative valence weighting tendency and routinely expect 
novel beans that more closely resemble known positives to be negative, they receive feedback 
about their incorrect expectations, serving to recalibrate their valence weighting bias toward a 
more balanced and objectively-appropriate direction. 
Importantly, this procedure provides people with immediate and clear feedback they 
rarely receive in their real lives –for instance, outcomes in real-life may themselves be 
ambiguous, allowing people to interpret the outcome in line with the expectations they formed 
(e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983; Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984); additionally, forming negative 
expectations may lead individuals to avoid situations and therefore never learn if their 
expectations were incorrect (e.g., Fazio et al, 2004). Moreover, the recalibration procedure 
provides feedback regarding the appropriate weighting of resemblance to known positives and 
negatives per se, unconfounded by all the natural correlates of valence in the real world (e.g., 
distinctiveness and diagnosticity). Thus, although this procedure is relatively simple, previous 
research demonstrates that giving people clear and immediate feedback about their valence 
weighting decisions appears to be a highly effective means of recalibrating their valence 
weighting biases (Fazio et al., 2015). 
As a consequence, people with initially negative valence weighting bias who are 
recalibrated (vs. control) form more positive expectations about future events in their lives, are 
more willing to take behavioral risks, are less rejection sensitive, and more (Fazio et al., 2015; 
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Pietri et al, 2013a). Further, this recalibration procedure appears to produce durable changes in 
people’s valence weighting biases that can have long-lasting effects (Pietri & Fazio, 2017). For 
example, one experiment found that first-year college students with negative valence weighting 
biases who underwent the recalibration procedure (vs. control) at the start of a semester became 
less rejection sensitive and formed more friendships over the course of the semester (Rocklage, 
et al., 2017). Experiment 3 capitalized on this simple yet effective procedure of manipulating 
people’s valence weighting biases. 
We first recruited a sample of participants expected to have relatively negative valence 
weighting biases at baseline (Pietri et al., 2013b). Then, we randomly assigned participants to 
complete either a recalibration or control version of BeanFest. Thus, this paradigm gave us 
experimental control of people’s valence weighting biases by recalibrating them to be more 
positive (vs. control). Later on, participants completed the same ambiguous scenario 
interpretation task as in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the imagery 
perspective participants used to visualize scenarios as they ranked the likelihood of positive and 
negative outcomes. Again, we hypothesized that first-person imagery (vs. third-person) would 
increase people’s reliance on their valence weighting bias when forming expectations. Thus, in 
Experiment 3, participants’ expectations should benefit from the valence weighting bias 
recalibration procedure when using the first-person perspective to visualize the scenarios, but 
should benefit less or not at all when using the third-person perspective. 
Method 
Participants. In order to identify a sample of participants who could be expected to have 
relatively negative valence weighting biases, we recruited undergraduates who scored in the top 
half of the distribution on the Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Downey & Feldman, 1996) 
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during a mass pre-screening administered to the undergraduate participant pool (Pietri et al., 
2013b). In it, respondents read eighteen possible-rejection scenarios such as, “You ask someone 
in one of your classes to coffee.” For each scenario, respondents rated how anxious or concerned 
they would feel about making the request on a scale ranging from (1) Very unconcerned to (6) 
Very concerned and rated how likely the other person would be to oblige the request on a scale 
ranging from (1) Very unlikely to (6) Very likely. We computed an index of rejection sensitivity 
following the standard convention and, following past recalibration procedures (Pietri & Fazio, 
2017; Rocklage, et al., 2017) that have capitalized on the fact that individuals who score higher 
in rejection sensitivity are characterized by more negative valence weighting tendencies (e.g., 
Pietri et al., 2013a, 2013b), we invited those who scored in the top half of the distribution to 
participate in the experiment. We recruited as many such eligible participants as possible within 
the timeframe of the academic year. 
One-hundred thirteen undergraduates participated for course credit. Analyses excluded 
participants whose computers crashed during the BeanFest game (n = 7) and participants who 
failed the self-report attention check at the end of the online session (n = 5), leaving data from 
101 undergraduates (74 female, 27 male; 24 first-person & control, 25 first-person & 
recalibration, 26 third-person & control, 26 third-person & recalibration). Sensitivity analyses 
indicate that this experiment is adequately powered to detect a small effect (f
2
 = 0.08) at 80%
power (Faul et al., 2007). 
Procedure & Materials  
Session 1 (In Lab): Manipulating Valence Weighting Biases. 
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Upon entering the lab, participants sat in individual cubicles and completed a battery of 
self-report questionnaires assessing individual differences in trait optimism (Life Orientation 
Test-Revised: M = 5.41, SD = 1.07, α = 0.78), hope (Adult Hope Scale: M = 5.99, SD = 0.75, α 
= 0.80), the Weighting Bias Questionnaire (M = 3.99, SD = 0.95, α = 0.81), and self-esteem 
(Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale: M = 4.16, SD = 0.73 α = 0.90). 
BeanFest Recalibration (Pietri et al., 2013a). After finishing the questionnaire, 
participants completed one of two versions of the BeanFest game. We randomly assigned half of 
the participants to complete a control version of the game, in which they classified novel beans 
during the test phase as positive or negative without any feedback, just like the traditional 
BeanFest game. The other half of the participants completed the recalibration version of the 
game (following the procedure reported in Pietri et al., 2013a), in which they were given 
feedback after every classification they made during the test phase, allowing them to learn from 
their errors and retrain their valence weighting biases. 
Participants in both conditions first read instructions about how to play the game. As in 
the traditional version of the BeanFest game, they were told they would be viewing beans one at 
a time and would need to decide whether to select each bean or not. Selecting a positive bean 
would increase their score by ten points whereas selecting a negative bean would decrease their 
score by ten points. If they did not select a bean, they would see no change in their score but 
would still receive information about the bean’s value. Thus, their goal was to learn which beans 
were positive and which were negative so that they could earn as many points as possible. 
The beans varied in their shape (10 levels from circular to oblong) and their number of 
speckles (1 to 10), creating the same 10x10 matrix of 100 beans used in the traditional BeanFest 
game. However, unlike the traditional BeanFest game that presented 36 game beans from 
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various pockets of the matrix, this version of the game presented 40 total game beans from the 
corners of the matrix. This difference has two important consequences. First, this version of the 
game is much easier, helping to ensure that participants learn which game-beans are positive and 
which are negative. Second, dividing the matrix in this way means that each of the 60 novel test 
beans is objectively closer to one of the four corners, creating a correct answer as to whether 
each novel test bean should be labeled positive or negative. 
After reading the instructions, participants began a practice game in which they viewed 
all 40 of the game beans. After the practice game, participants completed a classification training 
task to further help facilitate their learning of the game beans. During the training task, 
participants saw the game beans one at a time and had to classify each one as positive or 
negative. When participants correctly classified a bean, they moved on to the next one. However, 
when participants incorrectly classified a bean, they received the following message: “Error! 
This was *not* a Positive (Negative).” After the classification training task, participants played 
through two more blocks of the BeanFest game that each consisted of 40 beans randomly 
selected from the four corner sections of the matrix.  
After completing the second game block, participants continued on to either the control 
or recalibration version of the test phase. In both versions, participants saw all 100 beans from 
the matrix and had to classify each one as positive or negative. Although each of the 60 novel 
beans was objectively more similar to one of the regions of positive or negative learned game 
beans, biases in valence weighting can cause people to overgeneralize their past positive or 
negative learning and misclassify the beans. For instance, because we recruited a population 
expected to have particularly negative valence weighting biases, participants were likely to 
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overgeneralize their negative learning and misclassify some of the positive novel beans as 
negative.  
Participants in the control condition simply classified the test beans without any feedback 
about their performance. In contrast, participants in the recalibration condition received 
immediate, clear feedback about their decisions for every single bean during the test phase. 
When participants in the recalibration condition correctly classified a bean during the test phase, 
a message appeared saying, “Correct! This was a Positive (Negative)!!”And, when participants 
in the recalibration condition incorrectly classified a bean, a message appeared saying, “Error! 
This was a Positive (Negative)!!” As such, the recalibration procedure provided people an 
opportunity to learn from their performance in order to retrain their valence weighting tendencies 
to be more neutral and accurate.  
Session 2 (Online): Manipulating Imagery Perspective and Measuring Expectations 
That evening, we emailed participants a link to complete the second part of the 
experiment online, which used the modified Interpretation Questionnaire (Pietri et al., 2013a) 
from Experiment 1 to manipulate imagery perspective and measure expectations. As in 
Experiment 1, we randomly assigned participants to use the first-person or third-person 
perspective to imagine themselves in ambiguous future scenarios and rank-order three possible 
explanations for each scenario from most to least likely.
8
Results 
Recalibration Manipulation Check. 
8
 Also, as in Experiment 1, participants rated how vivid their imagery was and how easy it was to imagine each 
scenario. Neither vividness nor ease ratings differed significantly across perspective (vividness: F(1,100) = 0.77, p = 
0.38; ease: F(1,100) = 0.53, p = 0.47). 
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We first examined participants’ responses to the novel beans during the test phase to 
verify that the recalibration procedure (vs. control) successfully retrained participants’ valence 
weighting biases. To do so, we calculated participants’ average performance to the novel test 
beans by coding correct responses as +1 and incorrect responses as 0. As expected, participants 
in the recalibration condition performed significantly better (M = 0.69, SD = 0.10) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.07; F(1, 99) = 13.70, p < 0.001).  
However, we would predict that this effect should appear gradually over time as the 
participants completed the recalibration procedure. That is, we would not expect differences 
between recalibration and control at the start of the procedure and should expect the strongest 
effects at the end. To test this, we compared participants’ performance on the first twenty novel 
beans to their performance on the last twenty novel beans in a 2 (time point: first twenty vs. last 
twenty) x 2 (BeanFest condition: recalibration vs. control) mixed ANOVA. The interaction 
between time point and condition was significant F(1, 99) = 3.86, p = 0.05. There was no 
difference between recalibration and control condition performance for the first twenty novel 
trials F(1, 99) = 0.28, p = 0.60, but participants in the recalibration condition significantly 
outperformed participants in the control condition during the last twenty novel trials F(1, 99) = 
7.78, p = 0.01.  
Testing imagery perspective’s role in moderating recalibration’s effect on 
expectations. 
Primary Analysis 
We predicted that the imagery perspective participants used while imagining ambiguous 
future scenarios on the interpretation questionnaire would moderate the effects of recalibrating 
valence weighting bias. Specifically, the benefits of recalibration should be evident when 
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participants used first-person imagery but should be attenuated or eliminated when they used 
third-person imagery. To test this prediction, we scored participants’ responses to the 
interpretation questionnaire the same way as in Experiment 1 by subtracting their average 
negative scores from their positive scores to serve as an index of their expectations in each 
scenario (M = -0.28, SD = 0.53). Then, we predicted participants’ scores using a 2 (BeanFest 
condition: recalibration vs. control) x 2 (perspective: first-person vs. third-person) ANOVA. 
Replicating past research (Pietri et al., 2013a), there was a main effect of recalibration 
condition F(1, 97) = 5.79, p = 0.02 such that recalibrated participants formed more positive 
interpretations (M = -0.16, SD = 0.52) than did control participants (M = -0.40, SD = 0.52).
9
Critically however, as hypothesized, this effect was moderated such that recalibration’s effect on 
expectation formation was completely dependent upon imagery perspective, F(1, 97) = 4.23, p = 
0.04. The first-person perspective caused participants to rely on their valence weighting biases, 
such that recalibration (M = -0.06, SD = 0.46) caused them to form more positive expectations 
than control (M = -0.52, SD = 0.57), t(47) = 3.15, p < 0.01. In contrast, the third-person 
perspective caused participants not to rely on their valence weighting biases, resulting in no 
difference between recalibration (M = -0.24, SD = 0.55) and control (M = -0.28, SD = 0.44), 
t(50) = 0.26, p = 0.80. See Figure 3.
10
9
 There was no main effect of imagery perspective F(1, 97) = 0.10, p = 0.76. 
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Because we also measured self-beliefs about the future in this experiment, it was possible to test the effect of 
imagery perspective in moderating their role in the expectations participants formed. However, compared with 
Experiments 1 and 2, the design of Experiment 3 made detecting the effect of perspective on the role of self-beliefs 
more difficult. The primary goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether perspective moderated the effect of valence 
weighting bias recalibration. In order to detect mean level effects of the recalibration procedure, it is necessary that 
the direction of recalibration be the same for all participants. Thus, following protocol from research that developed 
the recalibration procedure, we recruited participants that were expected to have negative valence weighting biases 
and recalibrated half of them to be more accurate. While this restriction of range in our sample was necessary to test 
perspective’s role in moderating reliance on the valence weighting bias, it naturally interfered with the ability to test 
perspective’s role in moderating reliance on self-beliefs. Indeed, while the moderating effect of imagery perspective 
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Secondary analysis 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we calculated our primary dependent measure as a difference 
score between positive and negative interpretations and did not have theoretical reasons a priori 
to predict that the effects in the main analysis would be driven by effects on either negative or 
positive expectations alone. Analyzing the effects for positive and negative interpretations 
separately, we found that the strength (and significance) of the effects varied, but all of the 
effects were directionally consistent with the main analyses. Expectations reflected recalibration 
condition more in the first-person condition (vs. third-person condition), although the moderating 
effect of perspective was significant only for negative expectations (F(1, 97) = 5.23, p = 0.02) 
and not positive (F(1, 97) = 2.36, p = 0.13). 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, the patterns of data suggest that recalibration (vs. control) appears to 
have caused participants to form more positive expectations only when using the first-person 
perspective to visualize events. By attuning people to their recalibrated valence weighting biases, 
first-person imagery (but not third-person imagery) appears to have caused people to form more 
positive expectations (vs. control). As such, these results provide experimental evidence 
consistent with the possibility that manipulating (rather than simply measuring) valence 
on self-beliefs was directionally consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, it was not significant (b = 0.14, β = 0.17, t(95) 
= 1.13, p = 0.26). However, simple slope analyses do show that, consistent with our account, the self-beliefs 
composite significantly predicted participants’ expectations in the third-person perspective (b = 0.21, β = 0.33, t(95) 
= 2.59, p = 0.01) but not in the first-person perspective (b = 0.07, β = 0.11, t(95) = 0.76, p = 0.45). Experiment 4 
sought to address this issue by running a more highly-powered conceptual replication of Experiment 3. Additionally, 
meta-analyzing the interaction across all four experiments using Fisher’s method of combining independent p-values 
(as described in Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009) still yields a 
significant effect of imagery perspective in moderating the role of self-beliefs (Z = 3.85, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
0.30). Similarly, using this method to meta-analyze the interaction between imagery perspective and valence 
weighting (measured, as in Experiments 1 and 2, or manipulated, as in Experiments 3 and 4) also yields a highly 
significant effect (Z = 3.98 p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.30). 
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weighting biases produces effects with the bottom-up processing style evoked by first-person 
imagery, whereas the effect is  not present with the top-down processing style evoked by third-
person imagery. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 served several purposes: replicate the effects from the previous 
experiments with a larger more diverse sample, demonstrate behavioral consequences of the 
effects, and provide convergent evidence for the proposed mechanism. Experiment 4 used a 
sample of participants recruited from a different population (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers 
vs. undergraduates). As did Experiment 3, Experiment 4 recalibrated participants with negative 
valence weighting biases to be more neutral. The procedure also measured participants’ self-
beliefs about the future and then manipulated imagery perspective before participants formed 
expectations about an uncertain outcome. We expected to replicate the results from Experiment 3 
such that first-person imagery (vs. third-person) would increase people’s reliance on their 
valence weighting bias when forming expectations, thereby causing participants who were 
recalibrated (vs. control) to form more positive expectations. Additionally, because Experiment 4 
was more highly-powered than Experiment 3, we also expected to conceptually replicate the 
effects from Experiments 1 and 2 such that third-person imagery (vs. first-person) would cause 
people’s expectations to align with their self-beliefs about the future. 
Experiment 4 also included some important modifications aimed at extending the effects 
observed in Experiments 1 through 3. First, Experiment 4 sought to extend the current findings 
by employing a behavioral dependent measure—one that captures the momentary expectations 
people formed about anticipated outcomes in an actual task that had real monetary consequences 
for participants. Participants in Experiment 4 played a game that was designed to mirror the real-
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world decisions people face when deciding how to invest their money. People often display risk 
aversion when making investment decisions, which leads them to overinvest in risk-free options 
(e.g., bonds) and underinvest in somewhat riskier options that are more lucrative over time (e.g., 
stocks; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). Further, people who are more likely to 
expect and fear negative outcomes are particularly likely to make these suboptimal investment 
decisions (Riley & Chow, 1992), and as such, helping them overcome this tendency can improve 
their long-term financial well-being (Mehra & Prescott, 1985).  
Experiment 4 used a procedure (modeled after Thaler et al., 1997) that mirrors this real-
world issue. Participants played an investment game in which they needed to decide how to 
invest their funds across two options: one option was always a no-risk/low-reward option 
(mirroring the typical performance of bonds), whereas the other was riskier but, on average, 
provided greater returns (mirroring the typical performance of stocks). Thus, for each trial, 
participants had to form expectations about whether the high risk/high reward option would 
perform well (or poorly) in order to decide how to best invest their funds. To the extent that 
participants relied on their valence weighting biases, those who were recalibrated from an 
initially negative tendency toward a more balanced weighting (vs. control) should expect more 
positive outcomes from the high risk/high reward option and decide to invest in it more. 
Similarly, to the extent that participants relied on their self-beliefs about the future, those with 
more positive (vs. negative) self-beliefs should expect more positive outcomes from the high 
risk/high reward option and decide to invest in it more.  
Further, not only was the task designed to reflect the types of investing decisions that 
people make in the real-world, but participants also earned bonus pay at the end of the 
experiment based on the outcome of their performance in the investment game. As such, 
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participants’ investment decisions in the game held consequences for a real outcome in their 
lives–i.e., how much money they earned. 
Finally, Experiment 4 sought to provide convergent evidence of the proposed mechanism 
responsible for the moderating effects of imagery perspective across the previous experiments – 
specifically, that the effects of imagery perspective reflect a shift in processing styles. To do so, 
Experiment 4 used a different, previously-validated method of manipulating imagery perspective 
–a mindset manipulation that replicates the processing style differences observed with mental
imagery instructions (Shaeffer et al., 2015). Specifically, before completing the investment game 
participants viewed photographs that depicted a series of actions either from the first-person or 
third-person perspective. Importantly, the actions in the photographs were unrelated to the 
investing game. Previous research demonstrates that this method of manipulating perspective 
produces effects on subsequent judgments that replicate the effects observed when manipulating 
perspective in mental imagery relevant to the target judgment (e.g., Niese et al., 2018; Shaeffer et 
al., 2015). Such results support the notion that perspective is operating by shifting processing 
style rather than by merely changing salience of information that is only relevant to the pictured 
scene. Thus, if manipulating imagery perspective this way in Experiment 4 changes the 
expectation formation process in the subsequent investing task (i.e., causing expectations to align 
more with valence weighting tendencies with first-person imagery or self-beliefs with third-
person imagery), it would support the idea that processing style is a critical determinant of the 
extent to which biases in self-beliefs and valence weighting shape expectations on any given 
occasion. 
Method 
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Participants. In order to identify participants with a negative valence weighting bias, we 
first created a pool of participants who completed the Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire 
(Downey & Feldman, 1996) by paying 700 MTurk workers $0.25 to complete the questionnaire. 
Separately, we then invited participants who scored in approximately
11
 the top half of the
distribution to participate in the main experiment online. We aimed to recruit at least 299 
participants in order for the experiment to be well-powered to detect a small effect. Specifically, 
the experiment can detect a minimum effect size of f
2
 = 0.05 at 95% power (Faul, et al., 2007).
Three-hundred one MTurk workers participated in the main experiment in exchange for $4.00 
and an opportunity to earn up to $2.00 bonus depending on their performance in the investment 
game (164 female, 135 male, 2 preferred not to say; 77 first-person & control, 72 first-person & 
recalibration; 75 third-person & control, 77 third-person & recalibration).  
Procedure & Materials  
Manipulating Valence Weighting Biases 
BeanFest Recalibration (Pietri et al., 2013a). Participants read that they would be 
completing a variety of different tasks during the study. For the first task, participants completed 
an in-browser version of the BeanFest game. We randomly assigned participants to complete the 
control or recalibration version of the task. Following the procedure as in Experiment 3, 
participants in the control condition classified novel beans during the test phase as positive or 
negative without any feedback, whereas participants in the recalibration condition were given 
feedback after every classification they made during the test phase, allowing them to learn from 
their errors and retrain their valence weighting biases. 
11
 The study was completed in waves over the course of a week until we hit our target sample size for the main 
study. Thus, the exact midpoint of the rejection sensitivity distribution shifted as more participants were added to the 
pool. 
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Measuring Self-Beliefs 
After completing the BeanFest game, participants completed a battery of self-report 
questionnaires assessing individual differences in trait optimism (Life Orientation Test-Revised: 
M = 5.51, SD = 1.62, α = 0.89), hope (Adult Hope Scale: M = 5.72, SD = 1.24, α = 0.92), the 
Weighting Bias Questionnaire (M = 4.38, SD = 1.19, α = 0.86), and self-esteem (Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale: M = 4.32, SD = 1.01 α = 0.93). We combined z-scores of participants’ trait 
optimism and hope (r(301) = 0.67, p < 0.001) to create a composite index of participants’ 
propositional beliefs about their future (SD = 0.91). 
Manipulating Imagery Perspective and Measuring Expectations 
Participants then read that they would be alternating between two tasks in the final 
portion of the study: forming impressions of images and playing an investment game. 
Participants read the instructions for each task before beginning. The tasks were blocked such 
that participants viewed twelve images, completed twelve trials of the investment game, viewed 
the twelve images again, and then completed another twelve trials of the investment game. 
Manipulating Imagery Perspective (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009): The procedure 
manipulated imagery perspective using action photographs unrelated to the investment game. 
The photographs depicted hands performing simple common actions (e.g. wiping a spill). For 
each action there were two photographs that differed only in whether they were taken from the 
first-person or third-person perspective; the objects in the image and distance to the action 
remained constant (for example stimuli, see Libby et al., 2009). Participants were randomly 
assigned either to view the first-person or the third-person versions of the action photographs. 
The procedure informed participants that they would be viewing a series of images one at a time 
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and that they should pay attention to each one and try to form an impression of it in their mind. 
For each block, participants viewed a series of twelve images one at a time for 3.5 seconds each. 
Measuring Expectations in the Investment Game (modeled after Thaler et al., 1997): 
Participants read that they would also be playing an investment game in which they would need 
to make decisions about how to invest a set amount of money. Participants earned (or lost) points 
based on their decisions in each trial. Importantly, participants earned bonus pay based on their 
final summed score across all the trials. The procedure informed participants that performing at 
average would earn them about $1.00 bonus, and that performing below average would earn 
them less (minimum $0.00) while performing above average would earn them more (maximum 
$2.00). Thus, participants were encouraged to perform as well as they could because their 
decisions would have direct consequences for how much bonus pay they actually earned at the 
end of the study.  
We created a payout scheme in which participants earned a bonus of $0.00 if they scored 
less than 20 points in the game and at least $0.20 if they scored 20 points or more. For every 35 
points beyond the first 20 points, participants earned an additional $0.20 bonus (i.e., $0.40 total 
for scoring above 55 points, $0.60 total for scoring above 90 points, $0.80 total for scoring above 
125 points, etc.) up to a maximum of $2.00 for scoring 335 points or more (M = $0.89, SD = 
$0.33). 
For each trial in the game, participants were given 1000 shares to invest between two 
options, split however they like. In order to inform their decision on each trial, participants were 
shown line graphs depicting how each of the two options had performed over the last six months. 
In each trial, one of the options was more volatile, but overall showed greater growth 
(specifically, it increased in value by an average of 1.25% per month with a standard deviation of 
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+/- 3%). The other option was more stable and never decreased, but showed less growth 
(specifically, it increased in value by an average of 0.25% per month with a standard deviation of 
+/- 0.17%, truncated at 0). Thus, similar to the real-world decision that people face between 
investing their money in stocks and bonds, for each trial, participants needed to decide how 
much to invest in an option that earned more over time (but also had the chance of losing money 
on any given trial) or a less lucrative option that was safer. As such, the average amount of 
shares participants chose to invest in the high risk/high reward option (out of 1000) across the 
twenty-four trials served as our behavioral index of the extent to which participants’ formed 
positive (vs. negative) expectations about an uncertain outcome (M = 440.11, SD = 135.84). 
After making their decision for each trial, participants were shown how the two options 
performed in the next month of the game. The outcomes of the final month of each trial followed 
the same rules as the previous six months (i.e., across trials, the high risk/high reward options 
increased in the final month by an average of 1.25% with a standard deviation of +/- 3%, while 
the safe option increased in the final month by an average of 0.25% with a standard deviation of 
+/- 0.17%, truncated at zero). Participants earned points as a function of each option’s 
performance and the amount they chose to invest in each option. 
Results 
Recalibration Manipulation Check. 
We first examined participants’ responses to the novel beans during the test phase of the 
BeanFest game to verify that the recalibration procedure (vs. control) successfully retrained 
participants’ valence weighting biases. To do so, we calculated participants’ average 
performance on the novel test beans by coding correct responses as +1 and incorrect responses as 
0. As expected, participants in the recalibration condition performed significantly better (M =
Does the future look bright? 45 
0.63, SD = 0.12) than participants in the control condition (M = 0.57, SD = 0.07; t(278)
12
 = -
4.58, p < 0.001). Further, comparing participants’ performance on the first vs. last twenty novel 
trials showed a significant interaction between recalibration condition and time F(1, 277) = 
11.40, p < 0.01). There was no difference between recalibration and control for the first twenty 
novel trials F(1, 277) = 0.28, p = 0.59, but participants in the recalibration condition 
significantly outperformed participants in the control condition during the last twenty novel trials 
F(1,277) = 18.30, p < 0.001.  
Testing imagery perspective’s role in moderating recalibration’s effect on 
expectations and performance. 
We predicted that the imagery perspective manipulation would differentially facilitate 
reliance on the valence weighting bias and self-beliefs about the future, thereby influencing the 
basis for participants’ decisions to invest in the high risk/high reward option. Specifically, the 
benefits of recalibrating people’s valence weighting biases should be evident with first-person 
imagery, but should be attenuated or eliminated with third-person imagery. In contrast, 
participants’ decisions to invest in the high risk/high reward option should correspond more with 
their self-beliefs about the future with third-person imagery (vs. first-person). To test these 
predictions, we used a single linear-regression model to predict the average amount participants 
invested in the high risk/high reward option from their recalibration condition (-1 = control, 
recalibration = 1) and their self-beliefs composite, as well as imagery perspective (-1 = first-
12
 Due to a program malfunction, BeanFest performance data were not logged for twenty-two of the participants (11 
control condition, 11 = recalibration condition). Because these participants clearly received the manipulation, we 
chose to include them in the primary analysis on expectations (presented below). However, choosing to instead 
exclude these participants from the primary analyses does not change the significance of the interaction between 
imagery perspective and recalibration condition or the interaction between imagery perspective and self-beliefs. 
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person, 1 = third person) and its interaction with the other two measures. See Table 3 for the 
regression statistics. 
As hypothesized, the effect of valence weighting bias recalibration depended on the 
imagery perspective manipulation (b = -16.79, β = -0.12, t(295) = -2.17, p = 0.03). Recalibration 
(vs. control) caused participants to invest more in the high risk/high reward option with first-
person imagery (b = 33.15, β = 0.24, t(295) = 3.01, p < 0.01), but not third-person (b = -0.43, β = 
<-0.01, t(295) = -0.04, p = 0.97). Additionally, as predicted, imagery perspective had the 
opposite effect in determining the role of self-beliefs (b = 17.75, β = 0.12, t(295) = 2.09, p = 
0.04). Participants’ decisions to invest in the high risk/high reward option significantly 
corresponded with their self-beliefs about the future with third-person imagery (b = 27.19, β = 
0.18, t(295) = 2.23, p = 0.03), but not first-person imagery (b = -8.30, β = -0.06, t(295) = -0.70, p 
= 0.48). See Figure 4. 
Downstream Consequences 
Participants were paid a bonus depending on their performance in the investing game. 
Because the game was designed to mirror the real-world in which people’s risk aversion causes 
them to earn less over time, we expected that deciding to invest more in the high risk/high 
reward option would increase participants’ final performance-based pay. We predicted that 
participants’ pay would reflect valence weighting bias recalibration (as a function of investment 
decisions) with first-person imagery and that participants’ pay would reflect their self-beliefs 
about the future (as a function of investment decisions) with third-person imagery. We used the 
computational tool PROCESS (Model 10, Hayes, 2013) to calculate bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals with 10,000 samples to test if the indirect effects of valence weighting bias 
recalibration (-1 = control, 1 = recalibration) and the indirect effects of self-beliefs (low = -1 SD, 
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high = +1 SD) differed across imagery perspective condition (-1 = first-person, 1 = third-person) 
and if each was significantly different from zero. Doing so revealed that the two predicted 
moderated mediation pathways were significant. 
The indirect effect of valence weighting bias recalibration (through investment choice) on 
participants’ pay depended on imagery perspective (point estimate = -0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = 
-0.10 to -0.01). Valence weighting bias recalibration (vs. control) indirectly increased
participants’ final pay by increasing high-risk/high-reward choices after participants viewed first-
person imagery (point estimate = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.02 to 0.09), but not after they 
viewed third-person imagery (point estimate = -0.001, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = -0.03 to 0.03).  
The indirect effect of self-beliefs about the future (through investment choice) on 
participants’ pay also depended on imagery perspective (point estimate = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% 
CI = 0.001 to 0.05). More (vs. less) positive self-beliefs indirectly increased participants’ final 
pay by increasing high-risk/high-reward choices after participants viewed third-person imagery 
(point estimate = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.01 to 0.08), but not after they viewed first-person 
imagery (point estimate = -0.01, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = -0.05 to 0.02).  
Discussion  
Experiment 4 conceptually replicated Experiments 1 through 3 using a larger and more 
diverse sample. Imagery perspective determined whether valence weighting bias recalibration 
influenced the amount that participants decided to invest in a high risk/high reward investment 
option. Recalibration (vs. control) only caused participants to form more positive expectations 
and invest in the high risk/high reward option with first-person imagery (and not with third-
person imagery). Additionally, imagery perspective determined whether the amount that 
participants decided to invest in the high risk/high reward option aligned with their self-beliefs 
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about the future. Participants formed expectations in line with their self-beliefs with third-person 
imagery (but not first-person imagery). Further, these effects on participants’ decisions to invest 
in the high risk/high reward option held consequences for their final performance, producing 
differences in the actual amount of bonus pay they earned in the game. 
As such, Experiment 4 extended the findings from Experiments 1 through 3 by using a 
behavioral dependent measure that captures the momentary expectations people formed about 
anticipated outcomes in an actual task with real monetary consequences. This task was designed 
to mirror the real-world decision that people face about whether to invest their money in riskier 
options that have the potential for greater returns (such as stocks) or low-risk options with low 
returns (such as bonds). Importantly, many people tend to form overly negative expectations 
when making these decisions and overinvest in low-risk-options, which is a costly mistake: for 
instance, a dollar invested in the stock market in 1926 would be worth over $1100 fifty years 
later; but that same dollar invested in government bonds in 1926 would only be worth about $13 
fifty years later (Mehra & Prescott, 1985; Thaler, et al, 1997). As such, not only did Experiment 
4 demonstrate that processing style shifted the extent to which people’s decisions reflected their 
valence weighting tendencies, as opposed to their self-belief’s about the future, but also 
demonstrated a way to improve people’s decisions in this context. In particular, Experiment 4 
specifically recruited participants that were expected to have negative valence weighting 
tendencies, and found that recalibrating them caused them to invest more in the high risk/high 
reward option. However, this effect only occurred when another variable (i.e. first-person vs. 
third-person imagery) caused participants to use bottom-up processing. Thus, Experiment 4 
provides empirical support for the implications of the current findings. In particular, because 
people’s valence weighting bias and self-beliefs about the future operate via distinct processes, 
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processing style shapes whether the people’s expectations and behavioral decisions are based in 
one chronic bias or the other. 
Finally, Experiment 4 provided converging evidence for the role of processing style in 
shifting reliance on valence weighting biases versus self-beliefs. Experiment 4 manipulated 
imagery perspective with action photograph that were unrelated to the measure of expectations 
(i.e. the investing game) and only differed in whether they were taken from the first-person or 
third-person perspective. The fact that this manipulation produced carryover effects on 
participants’ subsequent behavior in the investing game implicates processing style as the 
mechanism by which perspective exerts its effects on the basis for individuals’ expectations.  
Discussion 
Across four experiments, imagery perspective determined whether participants’ 
expectations aligned with individual differences in their valence weighting bias, as opposed to 
their self-beliefs about the future. By evoking a processing style that privileges bottom-up 
influences, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) caused people’s expectations to correspond 
more with individual differences in their valence weighting biases, and less with their 
propositional beliefs about the positivity of their future. Further, two experiments manipulated 
people’s valence weighting bias, providing stronger evidence for its causal role in expectation 
formation with the bottom-up processing style evoked by first-person imagery, but not the top-
down processing style evoked by third-person imagery. Additionally, as demonstrated in a final 
experiment, these effects not only changed people’s reports of their expectations to hypothetical 
scenarios, but also influenced their actual risk-taking behavior in a task with real monetary 
consequences. 
Implications for Chronic Biases in Expectation Formation 
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A good deal of past research has demonstrated that people exhibit trait biases in their 
self-beliefs about the future, which predict the expectations people tend to form (Scheier, et. al., 
1994). More recent research has demonstrated that people also exhibit chronic biases in their 
valence weighting tendencies, which also predicts the expectations they tend to form (Fazio et 
al., 2015). However, as in previous research (Fazio et al., 2015), our participants’ valence 
weighting biases were not necessarily consistent with their self-beliefs (see footnote 7). Although 
this may suggest that one simply needs to take into account chronic biases on both dimensions to 
most accurately predict the valence of a person’s expectations on a given occasion, the current 
research highlights that it is also necessary to take into account the process by which people form 
their expectations on that particular occasion. That is, in order to accurately estimate whether 
people are likely to form positive or negative expectations on any given occasion, it is necessary 
to go beyond simply considering chronic individual differences and identify the factors that 
make people more likely to form expectations in line with one bias or the other on a given 
occasion.  
The present research sheds light on this issue by identifying a crucial distinction in the 
operation of these two trait biases in expectation formation. Specifically, people’s valence 
weighting biases and self-beliefs about the future appear to shape expectations via qualitatively 
distinct processes. The present experiments tested this idea by employing a manipulation (i.e. 
visual perspective) that is an integral element of the mental imagery people sometimes use when 
forming expectations and that has been shown in the past to differentially evoke processing 
styles that either privilege top-down or bottom-up processes (Libby & Eibach, 2011). 
Accordingly, the present experiments found that increasing the effects of top-down processes via 
third-person imagery (vs. first-person) made people more likely to form expectations in line with 
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their self-beliefs. In contrast, increasing the effects of bottom-up processes via first-person 
imagery (vs. third-person) made people more likely to form expectations in line with their 
valence weighting biases. Further, Experiment 4 provided more direct evidence that these effects 
reflect a shift in processing style by manipulating imagery perspective using photographs 
unrelated to the target of judgment.  Thus, these results provide evidence that, whereas self-
beliefs about the future operate via top-down processes that structure people’s expectations to 
align with their broader belief systems, the valence weighting bias operates as a bottom-up 
process that shapes people’s expectations by influencing their reactions to ambiguous 
information.  
As such, the current findings connect with the broader literature of theoretical and 
empirical work aimed at identifying distinct processing styles and the implications of adopting 
each (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2008). 
That is, the evidence in the current studies that these two biases operate via qualitatively distinct 
processes suggests that other variables that influence processing style should also shift whether 
people form expectations in line with one type of bias or the other. For instance, manipulating 
construal level by asking people to think about themselves in the distant (vs. near) future causes 
them to make more stable judgments that more consistently align with their self-beliefs 
(Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). Additionally, guiding people to think 
concretely (vs. abstractly) can reduce the impact of their negative self-beliefs –and this effect has 
been demonstrated using standard manipulations of construal level, as well as manipulations of 
imagery perspective (Kille, Eibach, Wood, & Holmes, 2017). Paired with the current findings, 
this suggests people might naturally form expectations more in line with their self-beliefs about 
the future when thinking about the distant (vs. near) future, or when other situational variables 
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encourage people to engage in abstract (vs. concrete) thinking (e.g. Zunick, Fazio, & Vasey, 
2015). 
In contrast, situational factors that encourage people not to reason through their decisions 
(e.g. Gawronski & Lebel, 2008; Wilson et. al., 1993) might increase the bottom-up influence of 
people’s valence weighting biases. For instance, directly instructing people to simply trust their 
intuitions (e.g. Jordan, Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007), “go with their gut” (e.g. Kendrick & 
Olson, 2012), or focus attention on their immediate experience without elaboration (e.g. Koole, 
Govorun, Cheng, & Gallucci, 2009) might cause people to form expectations in line with their 
valence weighting biases and less with their self-beliefs about the future. Consistent with this 
possibility, there is some evidence that both encouraging intuitive responding and speeding 
people’s decisions in a behavioral task increase reliance on their valence weighting biases 
(Rocklage & Fazio, 2014). 
Finally, individual differences that predict whether people tend to engage in one type of 
processing style or the other (e.g. Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) might also predict 
which trait bias in expectation formation typically predicts a given person’s expectations. 
Exploring these possible connections and developing a fuller understanding of the conditions that 
evoke one type of processing style or the other is an important direction for future theory and 
research.  
Future research could also benefit from further exploring the types of situations that 
naturally cause people to rely on their self-beliefs, rather than experiential processes, to inform 
their judgments and behavior. That is, beyond experimental manipulations that can direct people 
to rely more on their self-beliefs by evoking a top-down processing style, what naturally-
occurring cues in the immediate situation lead people to rely on their self-beliefs? Certainly, self-
Does the future look bright? 53 
beliefs seem likely to guide people’s behavior more in some situations than others. For instance, 
an intermediate skier deciding whether to attempt the challenge involved in a black diamond run, 
one that is classified as expert in nature, should be particularly likely to use his self-beliefs (e.g., 
about his skill level, how well things turn out for him generally, etc.) to inform his decision. 
However, those self-beliefs may be irrelevant to the same skier’s decision to try, once again, a 
favored intermediate run. That decision is likely to rest on an in-the-moment appraisal of factors 
such as his current state of fatigue or the current snow conditions. Thus, given that people seem 
likely to differentially rely on their self-beliefs and experiential processes in different situations, 
it is important to explore the cues that cause them to do so. Ultimately, a theoretical framework 
that incorporates these naturally-occurring cues will better allow us to predict whether people’s 
self-beliefs about the future or valence weighting biases are more likely to shape the expectations 
they form on a given occasion. 
Implications for Visual Imagery Perspective  
Further, the present findings are consistent with, and uniquely contribute to, previous 
evidence documenting the processing function of imagery perspective. Specifically, the present 
findings replicate previous work establishing that imagery perspective differentially facilitates 
distinct processing styles while adding nuance and depth to our understanding in a few 
theoretically-important ways. 
First, previous research shows that third-person imagery shapes people’s reactions in line 
with a host of relevant propositional beliefs such as their traits, values, preferences, and 
developmental trajectories (Libby et al., 2014; Libby & Eibach, 2011; Marigold, et al., 2015). 
Such findings support the idea that imagery evokes a processing style that facilitates the 
influence of top-down processes, causing people to understand simulated events in relation to 
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their explicitly-endorsed belief systems and propositional self-beliefs (Libby & Eibach, 2011). 
The present experiments provide convergent evidence for this account by conceptually 
replicating these effects in a new domain: self-beliefs about the positivity of the future. 
Further, the present findings offer discriminant validity to the processing function of 
third-person imagery. Past research has demonstrated a causal link between people’s 
propositional self-beliefs and their reactions to a pictured scene with third-person imagery (Libby 
Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005; Niese et al., 2018). By demonstrating third-person imagery’s ability to 
attenuate the effects of manipulations that do not appear to operate via top-down processes, 
Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that third-person imagery does not make people 
indiscriminately more sensitive to any manipulation. Rather, consistent with the processing style 
account, while manipulations of the top-down effects of people’s belief systems prove effective 
with third-person imagery (as demonstrated in past research), manipulations of bottom-up 
processes are not effective with third-person imagery (as demonstrated in the present 
Experiments 3 and 4). 
The present set of experiments also offers convergent validity for the processing function 
of first-person imagery. Previous work has found that first-person (vs. third-person) imagery 
causes people to respond more in line with their implicitly-measured reactions to features of a 
pictured scene (Libby et al., 2014) or manipulations of its concrete features (Niese et al., 2018). 
The present finding that first-person imagery caused people to respond more in line with their 
valence weighting bias is consistent with the previous work and also provides more direct 
evidence that such effects reflect an effect of perspective on processing style. More specifically, 
because valence weighting bias is a domain-general bottom-up process that is not bound to the 
specific content of any of the visualized scenes, the current experiments rule out the alternative 
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possibility that imagery perspective’s effects are driven by merely changing the salience of 
different content in the visualized image. Instead, by finding that first-person imagery caused 
people to form expectations in line with this domain-general bottom-up process, the current 
experiments provide stronger converging evidence for the processing style account. Further, 
because Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated valence weighting bias through recalibration, these 
experiments offer novel evidence for the causal role of bottom-up processes with first-person 
imagery. 
Additionally, Experiment 4 manipulated perspective in photographs unrelated to the 
events about which participants formed expectations and replicated the patterns from 
Experiments 1 through 3 that manipulated, via instruction, perspective in mental imagery 
concerning the very events about which participants formed expectations. This result is 
consistent with other research that replicates effects of perspective in mental imagery by varying 
perspective in photographs (Niese et al., 2018; Shaeffer et al., 2015), thereby providing 
convergent evidence for the role of processing style in producing perspective’s effects. 
Thus, the present findings provide converging evidence with previous research for the 
processing function of imagery perspective with first-person facilitating bottom-up processes and 
third-person imagery facilitating top-down processes. However, like the previous research, the 
current experiments relied exclusively on North American individuals, raising the question of 
whether the effects of the present experiments would generalize to other cultural contexts 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). As such, this is an important area for future 
investigation. Considering the current empirical evidence at this point, we speculate that the 
processing function of perspective may be constant across cultures, although the implications of 
evoking one processing style or the other may differ. 
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For example, there is evidence of cross-cultural differences in East Asian and North 
American individuals’ tendencies to use first-person versus third-person imagery (Cohen & 
Gunz, 2002; Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2006). However, across cultures, third-person 
imagery may still serve the common function of causing people to make sense of an event in 
relation to their broader belief systems –although important differences may arise based on the 
divergent top-down belief systems that the members of each culture tend to rely on (Libby & 
Eibach, 2011). For instance, East Asians’ tendency to view the self as interdependent (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991) may make them more likely to incorporate others’ opinions of the self with 
third-person imagery, whereas North Americans’ tendency to view the self as independent may 
make them more likely incorporate their own opinions of the self with third-person imagery. 
Thus, researching these types of questions on imagery perspective’s functional role in cognition 
across cultures is one promising area of future research that will be useful for understanding the 
generalizability of the present effects. 
Practical Implications 
Finally, these results hold implications for interventions designed to change people’s 
outlooks on life so that they can experience the beneficial outcomes associated with forming 
positive expectations. For instance, clinical psychologists have a long tradition of working to 
improve lives by reducing their patients’ pessimistic thoughts and self-views (Beck, 1967) and, 
more recently, by increasing their patients’ optimistic thoughts and self-views (Riskind, 
Sarampote, & Mercier, 1996). Further, the value of making one’s propositional self-beliefs more 
positive has also taken hold in popular culture –one only need browse a self-help section for a 
few minutes to find numerous books that provide tips on how to be an optimist, offer suggestions 
on how to increase one’s self-confidence, and extol the importance of “positive thinking” (e.g., 
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Seligman, 1991). However, while these approaches may be beneficial, the current experiments 
highlight the fact that people do not always use their self-beliefs to inform their expectations. As 
such, approaches that focus solely on helping people restructure these beliefs to be more positive 
may miss part of the problem. For instance, even if individuals come to adopt propositional 
beliefs that their futures are positive, they may still find themselves forming negative 
expectations if they possess a negative valence weighting bias and rely on bottom-up processes 
rather than top-down processes when faced with ambiguous events in the real world.  
Thus, the current experiments suggest that interventions aimed at improving self-beliefs 
about the positivity one’s future could be more beneficial if they were also paired with 
manipulations that encourage people to rely on those newly-improved beliefs. For example, 
mental imagery is a common tool in therapeutic interventions (e.g., Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 
2007; Stopa, 2009), and perspective is an inherent aspect of imagery that people are able to vary 
at will with minimal training. Given the role of perspective in shaping processing style, the 
present experiments suggest the promise of leveraging the power of perspective to improve the 
effectiveness of interventions. Additionally, the current experiments suggest that to create a 
positive change that is not constrained by the processing style a person is using in any given 
moment, it may be effective to complement techniques for changing people’s self-beliefs with 
interventions that are designed to improve biases in people’s valence weighting tendencies (or 
other relevant bottom-up processes, e.g. Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004). 
Conclusion 
The future is inherently ambiguous, and yet, people make predictions about it that can 
influence their current feelings, motivations, behaviors, and outcomes in life. While trait 
differences in people’s self-beliefs about the future and their valence weighting tendencies each 
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reliably predict the valence of the expectations they form, the two biases are not necessarily 
consistent (Fazio et al., 2015). By manipulating an integral element of future thinking -visual 
perspective in mental imagery- that plays a functional role in cognition (Libby & Eibach, 2011), 
the present experiments support the notion that these two biases operate via qualitatively distinct 
processes. By differentially invoking a processing style that privileges bottom-up or top-down 
processes, first- and third-person imagery differentially caused people to form expectations that 
aligned with their valence weighting bias or self-beliefs about their future. Thus, by providing 
evidence that a crucial difference between the two biases is that they operate via different 
processes, the present experiments provide insight into the types of situational influences that 
make one bias or the other more likely to exert its influence on expectation formation. As such, 
the present experiments improve our ability to know how positive or negative a person’s 
expectations will be on any given occasion and suggest a novel tool for helping to modify those 
expectations in desired ways. 
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Tables 
Predictor b β t(140) p 
Perspective <0.01 0.01 0.10 0.92 
Self-beliefs 0.20 0.34 4.46 <0.01 
Perspective x Self-beliefs 0.14 0.23 3.10 <0.01 
Valence weighting bias 0.19 0.08 0.98 0.32 
Perspective x Valence weighting bias -0.43 -0.17 -2.22 0.03 
Table 1. Statistics from a single linear-regression in Experiment 1 predicting valence of expectations based on 
participants’ valence weighting bias (sample-mean centered) and self-beliefs about the future, as well as imagery 
perspective (-1 first-person, 1 = third-person) and its interaction with each of the other two measures. 
Predictor b β t(115) p 
Number of responses -0.22 -0.17 -1.92 0.06 
Perspective 1.54 -0.07 -0.84 0.40 
Self-beliefs 3.84 0.16 1.81 0.08 
Perspective x Self-beliefs 4.67 0.20 2.20 0.03 
Valence weighting bias 22.09 0.19 2.10 0.04 
Perspective x Valence weighting bias -25.35 -0.22 -2.41 0.02 
Table 2. Statistics from a single linear-regression in Experiment 2 predicting valence of expectations based on 
participants’ valence weighting bias (sample-mean centered) and self-beliefs about the future, as well as imagery 
perspective (-1 first-person, 1 = third-person) and its interaction with each of the other two measures. 
Predictor b β t(295) p 
Perspective 5.79 0.04 0.75 0.45 
Self-beliefs 9.44 0.06 1.11 0.27 
Perspective x Self-beliefs 17.75 0.12 2.09 0.04 
Recalibration condition 16.36 0.12 2.12 0.04 
Perspective x Recalibration condition -16.79 -0.12 -2.17 0.03 
Table 3. Statistics from a single linear-regression in Experiment 4 predicting valence of expectations based on 
valence weighting bias recalibration condition (-1 control, 1 = recalibration) and participants’ self-beliefs about the 
future, as well as imagery perspective (-1 first-person, 1 = third-person) and its interaction with each of the other two 
measures. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Valence of participants’ expectations in Experiment 1 as assessed by a closed-ended 
measure, depending on imagery perspective and self-beliefs composite (Panel A) and imagery 
perspective and valence weighting bias (Panel B). Values are plotted within each perspective 
condition at one standard deviation above and below sample means of the valence weighting bias 
and the self-beliefs composite. Both interaction effects come from a single model predicting the 
valence of participants’ expectations from their valence weighting bias and their self-beliefs 
composite score, as well as imagery perspective and its interaction with each of the other two 
measures. 
Figure 2. Valence of participants’ expectations in Experiment 2 as assessed by an open-ended 
measure, depending on imagery perspective and self-beliefs composite (Panel A) and imagery 
perspective and valence weighting bias (Panel B). Values are plotted within each perspective 
condition at one standard deviation above and below sample means of the valence weighting bias 
and the self-beliefs composite. Both interaction effects come from a single model predicting the 
valence of participants’ expectations from their valence weighting bias and their self-beliefs 
composite score, as well as imagery perspective and its interaction with each of the other two 
measures. 
Figure 3. Valence of participants’ expectations in Experiment 3 as assessed by a closed-ended 
measure, depending on imagery perspective and valence weighting bias recalibration condition. 
Values are plotted at the cell means with standard error bars. 
Figure 4. Average number of shares invested in the high risk/high reward option (out of 1000) 
depending on imagery perspective and self-beliefs, as indexed by composite scores of trait 
optimism and hope (values plotted within perspective condition one standard deviation above 
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and below sample means; Panel A), and imagery perspective and valence weighting bias 
recalibration condition (Panel B). Both interaction effects come from a single model predicting 
the number of shares participants invested in the risky option from valence weighting bias 
recalibration condition and participants’ self-beliefs composite score, as well as imagery 
perspective and its interaction with each of the other two variables. 
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